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The Lexical Fallacy in Emotion Research:
Mistaking Vernacular Words for Psychological Entities
Alan Page Fiske
University of California, Los Angeles
Vernacular lexemes appear self-evident, so we unwittingly reify them. But the words and phrases of
natural languages comprise a treacherous basis for identifying valid psychological constructs, as I
illustrate in emotion research. Like other vernacular lexemes, the emotion labels in natural languages do
not have definite, stable, mutually transparent meanings, and any one vernacular word may be used to
denote multiple scientifically distinct entities. In addition, the consequential choice of one lexeme to
name a scientific construct rather than any of its partial synonyms is often arbitrary. Furthermore, a given
vernacular lexeme from any one of the world’s 7000 languages rarely maps one-to-one into an exactly
corresponding vernacular lexeme in other languages. Words related to anger in different languages
illustrate this. Since each language constitutes a distinct taxonomy of things in the world, most or all
languages must fail to cut nature at its joints. In short, it is pernicious to use one language’s dictionary
as the source of psychological constructs. So scientists need to coin new technical names for scientifically
derived constructs—names precisely defined in terms of the constellation of features or components that
characterize the constructs they denote. The development of the kama muta construct illustrates one way
to go about this. Kama muta is the emotion evoked by sudden intensification of communal sharing—
universally experienced but not isomorphic with any vernacular lexeme such as heart warming, moving,
touching, collective pride, tender, nostalgic, sentimental, Awww—so cute!.
Keywords: anger, emotions, kama muta, vernacular language
The languages we speak tend to shape how we think about the
world and even perceive it. This may be especially true for our
conceptions of immaterial things, where language is a vital tool for
apprehending, interpreting, remembering, reflecting, and, of
course, communicating what seems to occur. However, the lin-
guistic tools that work well for everyday life often fail as scientific
instruments. Because we have to observe and think with reference
to our vernacular lexemes in order to speak and listen, they become
traps that ensnare our perception and thought. The lexemes of each
language ensnare us in their own particular traps.
In the spirit of collegial reflection, it may be illuminating to
address this issue by beginning with a brief account of the struggle
that our lab went though that led us to realize that we needed to
transcend our own languages to craft a scientifically valid emotion
construct. A few years ago Thomas Schubert mentioned to Beate
Seibt, Lotte Thomsen, and me his perplexity at finding himself
shedding tears, despite feeling happy, while viewing scenes of
loving kindness in some children’s movies he watched with his
daughter. He said he also cried sometimes in action movies,
viewing scenes in which heroes endure pain and made sacrifices
for others whom they love. The three of us initially thought that
perhaps he shed tears because he was moved. Intrigued, we began
to look around and ask about moments when people reported
feeling moved; I also began to peruse ethnographies for simi-
lar cases. Some of my undergraduates did 10-week focused
participant-observation studies of practices and institutions where
we expected to find (and did find) such an emotion. We quickly
learned that most of the instances when people reported feeling
moved it was evoked by kindness or love. But sometimes people
used the word moved to refer to events that did not focus on
kindness or love, but where they could also denote their affect as
sad, angry, or simply emotional in some unspecified way. English
For the insights that emerged in our lab meetings, conversations, and
studies I warmly thank my colleagues in the Kama Muta Lab, especially
Beate Seibt, Thomas Schubert, Janis Zickfeld, Johanna Blomster, and Evi
Peterson, as well as our curious students, our careful collaborators, and our
responsively critical audiences. The ideas developed here also have deep
roots in conversations around the family dinner table and fishing in a row
boat with my father, Donald W. Fiske. The paper and I benefitted greatly
from discussions of earlier drafts with Zoé Fiske, Nick Haslam, Evi
Petersen, Thomas Schubert, Beate Seibt, and Rebecca Saxe. I am also
grateful to Johanna Blomster, Bilge Ipek Demirdag, Joseph Reiff, and Janis
Zickfeld for catching errors and omissions in a draft. In the Spring of 2019
I gave a talk on this topic to the Affective Science group at the University
of Oslo. A much, much briefer and simpler foreshadowing will appear as
a section of one chapter of a book in press at Routledge. I’ve also
mentioned the issue in a couple of paragraphs in one article and one
chapter: Fiske, Seibt, and Schubert (2017); Fiske, Schubert, and Seibt
(2017).
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to X Alan
Page Fiske, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los
Angeles, 375 Portola Plaza, Haines 341, Los Angeles, CA 90095. E-mail:
afiske@ucla.edu
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1
speakers often described moving experiences as touching or heart-
warming, but none of the terms is an exact synonym for the other
two. Thomas and Beate are German, and they speak Portuguese
and Norwegian, as well as Dutch; I speak French and Moore (the
language of the Moose of Burkina Faso). So we discussed how
people label this emotion in those languages—if and when they
label it. In most of these languages there are a number of words
that could be used to translate be moved. But in each case where there
appeared to be an obvious lexeme to translate moved, the translations
differ from the English vernacular lexeme, be moved: they were
broader in certain respects and narrower in others, with different
prototypes. The Moore language seems not to have any word that
closely corresponds to be moved. In short, the lexemes that most
commonly denote the emotion in these respective languages, if
any, do not map onto each other one-to-one. So we didn’t quite
know what to call the emotion.
At the same time, the further we looked, the more vernacular
lexemes we found that seemed to us to often denote this emotion
in particular cultural practices and social contexts, but whose usage
was limited to one specific domain: in English, for Mormon
worshippers, burning in the bosom; for worshippers in charismatic
churches, being touched by the Spirit; when thinking about expe-
riences of love and cozy belonging in the longed-for past, nostal-
gia; in reference to sentimental movies and narratives, tear-jerk-
ing; when listening to extraordinary music, perhaps enthralled or
enraptured; in profound moments of oneness with nature or a
divinity, mystical or ecstatic experiences. Often, it seemed to us,
what appeared to be the same emotion people labeled patriotic
sentiment when speaking about emotional identification with one’s
nation, or pride when speaking about one’s emotional identifica-
tion with one’s team, school, or gender identity. (And of course
pride is also used to denote an entirely different kind of feeling
when triumphing, surpassing, or standing above others.) We were
also intrigued to discover that Americans, Germans, Norwegians,
and the French seemed to experience this emotion when they saw
or interacted with cute human or animal babies—but couldn’t
name the emotion in that context. In contrast, we discovered that
colleagues and friends who speak Hungarian, Estonian, or Finnish
(Uralic languages) do have a specific label for what appeared to be
the same emotion in response to cuteness.
Searching for literature on this emotion, we were surprised to
discover that it had rarely been mentioned and never studied until
quite recently. We found that scholars now studying it do not agree
on the meaning of be moved, which some writers, without explor-
ing the matter, have treated as corresponding precisely to the
French être ému and/or the German bewegt and gerührt (Zickfeld,
Schubert, Seibt, & Fiske, 2019). There is not even agreement on its
valence. Some scholars believe the lexeme refers to a primarily
negative experience (Bartsch, Kalch, & Oliver, 2014). Others take
being moved to intrinsically consist of a combination of both
negative and positive affect (Frijda, 2007; Menninghaus et al.,
2015). Still others have written that the lexeme denotes a purely
positive experience (Cova & Deonna, 2014; Haidt, 2000). Several
scholars have conceptualized being moved as a distinct emotion
(Cova & Deonna, 2014; Menninghaus et al., 2015; Tan, 2009),
whereas others have assumed that being moved is not itself an
emotion as such, but rather one feature of a set of assorted
emotions (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Frijda, 2001, 2007;
Haidt, 2000). In their review, Weidman, Steckler, and Tracy
(2017) found that items calling for self-ratings of moved were used
in research in different labs to assess four seemingly distinct
constructs: sympathy, empathic concern, empathy, and sadness.
Items based on the lexeme moved are also widely used to measure
‘elevation’ (e.g., Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010; see Pohling &
Diessner, 2016, and Thomson & Siegel, 2017).
Claparède (1930) construed a closely correspondent French
vernacular lexeme, être ému, as the core and root of all emotion.
In contrast, several recent writers take being moved to be an
intrinsically esthetic emotion that occurs uniquely as a specific
reaction to art (Konecˇni, 2005, 2011, 2015; Menninghaus, et al.,
2017; Schindler et al., 2017). This in turn contrasts with Cova and
Deonna’s (2014; Cova, Deonna, & Sander, 2017) use of the
English and French lexemes to denote an emotion that results from
core societal values being affirmed, especially against a back-
ground in which they were challenged. Each of these scientific
usages of be moved is more or less within the broad and nebulous
scope of English vernacular be moved, but they differ from each
other; each research group is studying a different set of phenom-
ena.
For these reasons and more discussed below, we borrowed a
phrase from Sanskrit and coined a term for our scientific construct,
“kama muta,” stipulating its definition (Fiske, Schubert, & Seibt,
2017; Fiske, Seibt, & Schubert, 2017). Stipulating the meaning of
this term using a dead language minimizes the hazard of denoting
the construct with a vernacular lexeme that means different things
in different discourse contexts, to different people, in different
dialects and social classes, and at different points in history. (In
Sanskrit, kama muta meant moved by love, which approximates
what we mean—but our stipulation of the meaning of the scientific
term does not depend in any way on whatever this lexeme once
meant to Sanskrit speakers.)1
Stipulating its definition doesn’t make the construct valid, of
course; it just makes it clear what we think it is. Indeed, the
stipulation is very much a theoretical posit, but that’s a good thing
that a nonvernacular term for the construct makes clear: having
posited it makes it possible to do research to see whether any such
emotion exists as stipulated.
We stipulate that kama muta typically is:
• evoked by a sudden intensification of a communal sharing
relationship;
• momentary (brief);
• subjectively positive (in various senses yet to be resolved);
• when sufficiently intense, often characterized by some of
the following sensations and signs:
– a warm or other pleasant feeling in the center of the chest,
– tears or moist eyes,
– being choked up (having a lump in the throat that affects
speech),
– goosebumps or chills,
– feeling buoyant (light),
– making an exclamation such as Awwww!
– putting one or both palms on the chest;
1 Because we explicitly disclaim any intent to mean what Sanskrit
speakers ever meant by the lexeme, the use of a dead language to name a
construct is less felicitous than using an arbitrary symbol, say, . But kama
muta is more memorable and less intimidating than .
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2 FISKE
• and it generates motives to devote and commit to communal
sharing.
Communal sharing is one of the four fundamental structures of
social life posited by relational models theory (A. P. Fiske, 1991,
1992; A. P. Fiske & Haslam, 2005). It is a relationship in which the
participants treat each other as socially equivalent in respect to the
aspect(s) of the interaction that they are coordinating. Roughly
speaking, communal sharing is love in the broadest sense, includ-
ing romantic and familial love, bonds among teammates and
members of a platoon, or members of a group who identify with
each other. It involves treating each other’s needs and suffering as
one’s own, and taking collective responsibility for each other. The
core of our theory is that the sudden intensification of a communal
sharing relationship evokes kama muta. The sudden intensification
may occur, for example, in a reunion or reconciliation, at a birth,
a marriage proposal or wedding, when one feels welcomed or
receives a notable kindness, when participating in a social move-
ment, in a patriotic ritual, watching a movie or video, or reading
poetry. Intensification may consist of a sudden memory; one’s
heart going out to a cute or needy being; or when, after separation
or loss, one feels the love that makes one miss someone who is
gone. We do not yet know just how sudden the intensification must
be to evoke kama muta.
By these criteria, the evidence we have collected from many
sources strongly suggests that kama muta is prevalent in innumer-
able contexts of communal sharing intensification around the
world, throughout history. However, we cannot yet say precisely
how many of these features must be present, or how much of each,
to qualify an affective event as kama muta. Moreover, we cannot
yet fully theorize how they are interconnected. For example, what
is the function of the sensations and signs, so what difference does
it make how many sensations and signs are present in a given
instance? I myself very often experience kama muta without any of
the characteristic sensations and signs; does that matter?
The reason for us to consider the definition of the kama muta
construct here is simply to illustrate the need to delineate any
construct with reference to multiple features. By stipulating multi-
ple features whose integrated coherence defines the construct, one
escapes being trapped in the pitfall of having to identify instances
using only one feature, especially an unreliable vernacular label.
Indeed, all kinds of evidence supports the coherence of these
defining features of kama muta (A. P. Fiske, 2020; Schubert,
Zickfeld, et al., 2018; Seibt, Schubert, et al., 2017; Seibt, Schubert,
Zickfeld, & Fiske, 2017, 2019; Steinnes, Blomster, Seibt, Zickfeld,
& Fiske, 2019; Zickfeld, Schubert, Seibt, Blomster, et al., 2019).
Based on the ethnological and historical evidence, interviews,
participant observation, and scores of experiments with well over
10,000 participants in 15 languages in 19 nations, we know that
these features tend to co-occur in myriad contexts in a great many
cultures. We take that to mean that kama muta may be a ubiquitous
natural kind. In contrast, if one defined a psychological construct
by the usage of a particular vernacular lexeme (or a set of vernac-
ular lexemes), one could make no inference about the validity of
the construct as a psychological natural kind. That is the thesis of
this article: the lexical fallacy consists of reifying a vernacular
lexeme as a psychological entity. Committing this fallacy has wide-
spread pernicious consequences for theory, research, integration of
studies from different labs, and communication of scientific ideas.
However, I use our experience studying the kama muta con-
struct simply to illustrate one way of avoiding the lexical fallacy
and the errors it leads to. This article is not focused on kama muta
theory or the evidence supporting it. In any case, kama muta is a
provisional construct and kama muta research is still in its infancy;
we do not know where this research will lead.
Let us return to the observation that the researchers who
study the constructs they base purely on the vernacular lexemes
being moved or être ému do not agree about even the most
fundamental features of that emotion. Disagreements about the
features of an entity are ubiquitous in the early stages of any
science, and fruitful when they lead to closer observation and
more valid measurement. What is not fruitful is debate in which
the disagreements occur because different researches are refer-
ring to different entities. Imagine that British scientists report
that blackbirds primarily eat insects, worms, and snails, and that
they make cup-shaped nests on top of branches. But American
scientists report that blackbirds are omnivorous, make nests that
hang below branches, and have strong muscles that enable them
to pry open fruit or bark. Both are correct about what English
speakers in their respective regions typically call blackbirds.
But in Britain blackbird generally refers to one or another
species in the family Turidae, while in the New World black-
bird generally refers to one or another species in the family
Icteridae (although in each case usage is more complicated;
regional dialects differ and usage changes over time). Argu-
ments and evidence concerning the features of blackbirds are
fruitless; what is fruitful are observations of the respective
features of each specific species and population of Turidae and,
separately, each specific species and population of Icteridae.
Similarly, the polysemy and ambiguity of be moved as a
scientific construct results in conceptual confusion and errone-
ous comparisons of empirical results from studies of distinct
entities. So we propose that the first step on the path to clarity
is straightforward: give each of these constructs a different
scientific name, a name that has only one meaning, precisely
articulated and used in a rigorously consistent manner. Until we
do this, we’re just talking past each; we cannot have a coherent
conversation.
We were fortunate in the polyglotism of our research group
because it immediately helped to protect us from the lexical
fallacy of conflating the usage of a vernacular lexeme—say, be
moved—with the features of a mental state (on related issues,
see Hruschka, Munira, Jesmin, Hackman, & Tiokhin, 2018). In
part because of this multilingualism, what we eventually real-
ized is that we did not need or want to study the nature of the
vernacular lexeme, be moved, or any similar lexeme in any
other natural language. Our aim was not to write a dictionary
entry, but rather to understand psychological, social relational,
cultural, and eventually ontogenetic, biological, and evolution-
ary process related to certain phenomenologically identifiable
affective moments. We wanted to study the emotion itself—not
the usage of related vernacular lexemes in any language. So we
named the emotion “kama muta” and defined it precisely,
enabling us to explicitly stipulate, “This is kama muta”—
regardless of whether or how various sorts of speakers in
disparate discourse contexts labeled it in any given utterance in
any particular setting in any particular vernacular language. If
we had been lexicographers contributing to a dictionary, then
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3LEXICAL FALLACY
we would indeed have aimed to describe how each given speech
community used each vernacular lexeme in specified contexts.
But our aim as psychologists and anthropologists was not to
understand word usage and meanings as such, but to understand
the kama muta emotion itself. Or rather, to detect whether there
is a natural kind, kama muta, and if so, to determine its features.
Of course, our stipulation may turn out not to delineate a natural kind,
but we hope that explicating the construct as clearly as possible will
enable us to find out—and thereby incrementally delineate more valid
approximations of something like kama muta.
Once we make this distinction between language and mind, it is
perfectly sensible to study the usage of vernacular lexemes (in
English, and every other language), as such. Lexicographers gen-
erally take a subjective, qualitative approach to writing dictionary
definitions, which is fine for dictionaries but leaves a lot of
ambiguity that can only be resolved by systematic sampling and
sophisticated statistical analyses. In a pioneering study that indi-
cates what can be achieved in that way, Cowen and Keltner (2017)
mapped the English emotion lexicon by analyzing 853 English-
speaking participants’ labeling of 2,185 quite varied short video
clips, illuminating with new precision the usage (in this artificial
discourse context) of the vernacular English lexemes they studied.
As a complement to such quantitative methods in artificial settings,
“In-depth engagement with the population, through observation, con-
versations, and interviews, is important for identifying how people use
key terms of interest in everyday life” (Hruschka et al., 2018).
The Pernicious Reification of Vernacular Lexemes as
Scientific Constructs
Briefly stated, the thesis of this article is that many psycholo-
gists, philosophers, neuroscientists and others have been beguiled
by their language, often reifying vernacular emotion lexemes by
taking it for granted that they correspond one-to-one with affective
states. This is evident in Table 1, which displays the emotion
constructs used by some of the most influential recent scholars.
The Table shows that of the 255 (highly redundant) terms in the
10 sources, only three, listed as likely emotions by Ekman and
Cordaro (2011), are not common vernacular English lexemes;
those three are vernacular lexemes from other European languages.
After completing this Table 1 discovered a compilation of earlier
concepts of “basic emotions” (Kemper, 1987). In Kemper’s 17
lists, all but one of the terms (“knitbrow”) are common vernacular
lexemes (nearly all also included in my own table above). Again,
looking at an authoritative source, the most recent edition of the
Handbook of Emotions (Barrett & Lewis, 2016), one finds chapters
on the following emotions: fear, anxiety, anger, embarrassment,
pride, shame, guilt, hubris, disgust, gratitude, compassion, love,
empathy, sadness, and depression. That makes 14 English vernac-
ular lexemes and one Greek one. Of course, just reading these
scholars’ lists doesn’t definitely show that they are committing the
lexical fallacy; any of them could be adopting vernacular lexemes
as names for precisely defined constructs with more solid scientific
foundations than a dictionary. But in fact few of them even bother
to explicitly define the concepts they list—perhaps because they seem
too obvious, as well-known lexemes whose usage is common sense.
Most emotion scholars base their emotion constructs de facto in
vernacular English words, yet at the same time, except for a few
extreme linguistic constructionists, nearly all agree that there is
more to emotions than their labels. Hence it follows epistemolog-
ically that emotion constructs should be defined with reference to
the combination of features or components that are conjunctively
distinctive of each. Concordant with the general consensus among
emotion researchers (for an elegant integrative review, see
Scherer, 2000), my kama muta research colleagues and I posit that
emotions are identified and distinguished by the combination of
characteristic appraisals, subjective valence, motives (behavior
tendencies), and presumably neural substrates, neurochemistry,
and physiology.2 We also believe that a set of correlated sensations
and physiological states, taken in combination, tends to character-
ize particular emotions, especially when the emotion is intense.
But we are cautiously doubtful that mild emotion experiences
necessarily involve subjective sensations—and for sure no one
sensation is uniquely characteristic on any one emotion.
Like other emotion researchers, we know that people often label
their emotions. But we do not believe that verbal labels are a
necessary feature of emotional experiences—people sometimes
have emotions they do not name, or do not even notice. Moreover,
people are neither consistent nor precise when they do label their
own or others’ emotions. And we know that different languages
use different implicit taxonomies of ‘emotions’ (a category that is
not present in all languages; see Wierzbicka, 1999, 2014). That’s
where we differ from many emotions researchers, and those are the
pivotal points of this paper. However, if the emotion is lexicalized
in a given context in a given language, we certainly believe that the
correlated set of discourse context-contingent labels commonly
used by a given population of speakers is one adjunct feature that
is methodologically useful in identifying an emotion, when used in
conjunction with its other features.
Where we depart from the implicit assumption in much emotion
research is in our conviction that if one bases a construct primarily
on a vernacular lexeme, one will generally not find that the other
facets cohere. The set of events that people label with a given
lexeme will not share a distinctive appraisal; and/or will not all
have the same valence; and/or will not share a distinctive set of
sensations, signs, or physiological characteristics; and/or will not
generate a distinctive motive; and/or will have no distinctive
neurobiological patterns (systems of regional neural activations or
hormonal cascades). Indeed it seems to me, at least, that decades
of research relying on constructs based on vernacular English
lexemes has failed to convergently validate any of them as a
natural kind jointly characterized in this way.3 Some scholars have
simply equated emotions with their labels, labeling of sensations,
or labeling of an area of a plane defined by valence and arousal
coordinates (Barrett, 2014, 2017; Damasio, 1994; James, 1890;
Lindquist, Satpute, & Gendron, 2015; Lutz, 1988; Rosaldo, 1980).
But this seems to me to be a very narrow way to define emotion.
And it is difficult to reconcile labeling approaches with theories
2 Though we certainly don’t believe that any emotion is reducible to its
biology, and we do believe that the biology of every emotion is responsive
to, informed by, and contributes to sociocultural psychological processes.
3 I leave out distinct facial expression because I believe that the evidence
now clearly shows that the so-called basic emotions are not associated with
universally produced or universally recognized facial expressions (Barrett,
Adolphs, Marsella, Martinez, & Pollak, 2019; Fernández-Dols & Russell,
2017; Fridlund, 2017; Leys, 2017). We have seen no indications that there
is a distinctive facial expression associated with kama muta as such.
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4 FISKE
that emotions are adaptive at any functional level, or with the
presumption that people (including preverbal infants and adult
aphasics) and animals have functionally differentiated emotions.
Conversely, if we find emotional events that are empirically
characterized by the intersection of a certain appraisal, a certain
valence, a certain motive, certain sensations, and perhaps a specific
neurobiology, we will find that people refer to such instances using
diverse lexemes that depend on language, dialect, speaker, dis-
course context, and other sociolinguistic factors: there will not be
any one word specifically and uniquely used to label all of those
experiences that the other features jointly delineate as a natural
kind.
I want to emphasize here once again that the principal reason
that I discuss integrative multicomponent approaches to emotions
and illustrate it with the kama muta construct is to demonstrate
what they imply for epistemology: that to identify or measure
emotions, one does not need to rely on labels alone, and should not
use vernacular lexemes as the basis for formulating scientific
emotion constructs. My goal here is not to defend an integrative
multicomponent theory of emotions, or any other theory, nor do I
aim to explicate, much less support, kama muta theory in partic-
ular. On the contrary, I am to raise a problem that, as Table 1
illustrates, applies across a wide range of emotion theories and
lines of research—and show that there exists at least one other
plausibly productive way to proceed.
An important issue that I must sidestep in this article concerns
the most fruitful level of taxonomy for exploring a given phenom-
enon. For different purposes one may theorize and analyze prop-
erties and interactions of hadrons, of their component quarks, or of
types of quark (up, down, charm, etc.). We’ve always wondered
whether there are subtypes of kama muta, and certainly recognize
that there are important differences between, say, kama muta in
feeling the love of the Virgin Mary, feeling the love of Krishna,
and watching a Pixar movie. But we haven’t yet got solid or
implicative ideas about any such subtypes. Likewise, there may be
meaningful similarities that would make it useful for some pur-
poses to group kama muta with related emotions in one or more
levels of broader categories in some taxonomy or taxonomies.
However, at the moment it appears that just as species is a
consistently useful level of taxonomy for understanding develop-
ment, anatomy, demography, behavior, and ecology, likewise
kama muta captures a level of entitivity that affords a lot of
generalizability and functional connections with other highly en-
tative and well-validated entities and processes.
To return to the broader issue of how to identify valid psycho-
logical entities, our thesis is that an emotion is whatever it is,
regardless of what people construe it to be. In particular, an
emotion is what it is regardless of how people label it, regardless
of whether they label it, and regardless of whether their language
provides any simple way to label it at all. Of course, one could
define an emotion in a purely constructivist way (Harré, 1986) as
whatever people label their affective state (perhaps including the
affective states they label and attribute to others). But this reduces
emotions to folk constructs. If an emotion consisted simply of
naming sensations, then English speakers, for example, would
have hundreds of emotions, with old emotions disappearing and
new ones constantly emerging as the language changes, and speak-
ers of each dialect having distinct sets of emotions. Preverbal
infants would not have any emotions, nor would aphasics. Nor
animals. But computers able to produce words would, thereby,
have whatever emotions they labeled themselves as having. In
contrast, we posit that emotional experience is not limited to what
we can accurately name in the languages that one happens to
speak.
To state this affirmatively, unlike constructionists, we posit that
unlabeled and unconceptualized emotions occur (and not simply as
unnamed areas on a plane defined by some unspecified species of
valence and some amorphous sort of arousal). Also in contrast to
constructionists, we posit that people have emotions that neither
they nor others necessarily realize they have, that a person is likely
to give different labels to the same emotion in different contexts,
and on different occasions a person may use the same label to
reference entirely distinct emotions. We also posit that despite
great variation across the world’s languages in the delineation of
emotion lexemes, emotions themselves are universal.
At the same time, however, we emphasize that the labeling of
emotions has a substantial effect on people’s perception of their
mental states, their attention, memory, communication, and illo-
Table 1
Emotion Constructs From Ten Influential and Recent Sources
Tomkins & McCarter, 1964 interest/excitement, enjoyment/joy, surprise/startle, distress/anguish, fear/terror, shame/humiliation, contempt/
disgust, anger/rage
Ekman, 1992 anger, fear, disgust, sadness, interest, contempt, surprise, guilt, shame, embarrassment, awe
Roseman & Smith, 2001 joy, sadness, fear, anger, guilt, love, shame, pride, guilt, regret
Scherer, 2005 pride, elation, happiness, satisfaction, relief, hope, interest, surprise, anxiety, sadness, boredom, shame/guilt,
disgust, contempt, hostility, anger
Izard, 2009 joy, interest, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, shame, guilt, contempt, empathy
Panksepp, 2011 SEEKING/expectancy, RAGE/anger, FEAR/anxiety, LUST/sexuality, CARE/nurturance, PANIC/separation,
PLAY/joy
Ekman & Cordaro, 2011 anger, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, contempt, happiness
“Expect that evidence will be found for”: sensory pleasures, amusement, relief, excitement, wonder, ecstasy
or bliss, naches, fiero; Schadenfreude, rejoicing
“Special cases . . . additional evidences is required from cross-cultural studies”: guilt, shame, embarrassment,
envy, familial compassion, jealousy, love, hate, interest
Tracy, 2014 fear, anger, disgust, pride, shame
Keltner, Tracy, Sauter, Cordaro, &
McNeil, 2016
amused, anger, awe, boredom, confused, contempt, content, coy, desire, disgust, embarrassed, fear, gratitude,
happiness, interested, love, pain, pride, relief, sadness, shame, surprise, sympathy, triumph
Nummenmaa & Saarimäki, 2019 anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise
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5LEXICAL FALLACY
cutionary performance. Furthermore, labeling an emotion is just
part of the sociocultural process of giving it meaning, which has
far-reaching implications.
Having laid out the overall thesis, let’s detail in turn each aspect
of the lexical fallacy.
Vernacular Lexemes Are Good for Everyday
Discourse But Make Bad Scientific Constructs
Some psychologists, indulging our natural tendency to reïfy whatever
we name, seem to assume that we have to recognize “an emotion” of
distinctive quality corresponding to every name used in popular and
literary description of emotional experience. McDougall (1923,
p. 314)
Writing about emotion theory, Kagan (2007, p. 3) made a
similar point, recommending the advantages of “attending first to
robust phenomena,” rather than doing what “some psychologists
and most philosophers” did: “imposed definitions on popular, but
ill-defined, concepts before exploring the full range of observa-
tions to which the words were supposed to refer.” In a later
chapter, Kagan (2007, pp. 117–118) concludes that, “The problem
with emotion words, then, is that each has multiple and thus
ambiguous meanings. . . . A second reason why most emotional
terms have ambiguous meanings is that individuals occasionally
use different words to describe feelings that, if measured, might be
similar.” Commenting on review articles in an issue of Emotion
Review, Majid (2012b) similarly noted that a major issue in this
field is “how to talk about the science of emotion and not be
trapped by the semantics of English . . . the history of science has
shown repeatedly that restricting ourselves to English terminology
has fatal consequences . . . it is problematic, if not downright
dangerous, to ground our theories on English terminology alone.”
As Wierzbicka observed in the title of her 2014 book, philosophers
and psychologists have been Imprisoned in English.
Vernacular lexemes are generated by interacting cultural, his-
torical, communicative, and social relational processes, such that
in natural language, the meaning of a lexeme is simply the manner
that it is used. Usage need not directly, clearly, or accurately reflect
anything outside of language itself and the social relations that it
mediates. The widespread felicitous use of a lexeme does not
magically make its referent stable, materially existent, or empiri-
cally distinct from the referents of other vernacular lexemes. Yet
scientists, like others, are prone to take for granted that everyday
words actually denote entities or processes that have objective
reality beyond the communicative realm itself. This reification
occurs despite the fact that we know that many words denote
socioculturally constituted concepts, not real entities in the mate-
rial world: unicorn, yeti, witch, omen, fate, ESP, levitation, brain
washing. English speakers used to speak of a person having the
vapors, or hysteria, which we now know are not scientifically
meaningful entities. Other words denote material things, but the
concepts they denote have no scientific use because they do not
denote distinctive categories comprising a set that shares scientif-
ically meaningful features, histories, or consistent causal relations
with other entities. Tree, fish, bug, jerk, pervert, fanatic, mother
fucker simply do not cut nature at its joints.
The distinctions and features that are socially and culturally
important for speakers in everyday discourse differ from the dis-
tinctions and features that are essential to scientific understanding.
If a speaker says, “It’s hot; let’s find a shady tree to rest under,” the
speaker is concerned with the opacity to solar radiation of large
plants (or just wants an excuse to get closer to the person she’s
addressing). For a few ecological purposes, botanists, too, might
be primarily interested in the air or soil temperatures in the shade
of large plants. But the evolutionary, ecological, reproductive, and
growth factors involved in the insolation parameter, and every-
thing else about these plants, can only be adequately explained
with reference to biological properties that differ among Pinopsida
and other gymnosperms, among genera of Angiosperms, among
cycads, Ginkgoaceae, and Yucca brevifolia. Biologically speaking,
there is no such thing as trees. Likewise, as a social action, it may
be apposite to use epithets such as bastard! or bitch! But these
vernacular lexemes are of little use to psychologists who want to
explain the ontogeny, neurobiology, personality, or social psychol-
ogy of the target of these epithets.
To say, You’re making me angry! is a meaningful linguistic act,
but that does not imply that anger is a scientifically meaningful
emotion entity. People come to their doctors with complaints of
stomach aches, or describe themselves as listless or spaz. But
medicine would not have achieved what it has achieved if it
directly based its disease constructs on these or the other vernac-
ular labels that patients use to label their conditions. Which is not
to say, either for medicine or emotion science, that listening to
people’s accounts is not one of the many essential tools for
identifying a person’s state—listening is one component that may
be useful in medical diagnosis, and one component that may be
useful identifying emotions. But language alone is not a reliable or
sufficient basis for identifying either medical conditions or psy-
chological states.
Yet it is not uncommon for psychologists to begin an article by
quoting a dictionary definition, as if an entry in a dictionary of
vernacular language consisted of a psychologically, socially, or
culturally valid construct that extends beyond linguistic usage. As
I suggested above, we need to recognize that lexicographers
merely record how people use words; they make no claims about
what’s in the real world beyond language.
One might imagine that when people are naming their own
psychological state, at least, they know what they are talking
about—when the informant says she’s moved, it’s her mind and
she should know what is going on there. But this is not the case.
People do not know when they are subitizing or using their analog
magnitude system, or when they are making source memory er-
rors; they do not know how they recognize phonemes. They do not
even know that subitizing, the analog magnitude system, source-
memory errors, or phonemes exist. They do not know when they
are motivated by dissonance reduction. The semantic, proposi-
tional, reflective, and linguistic processes that are involved in
labeling things, including naming mental states, simply do not
have direct or reliable analytical access to most of the rest of the
mind (see Carruthers, 2011). In the case of emotions, to label their
emotions people cannot be directly relying on their sensations
alone; if they did, and if emotions are universal, every language
would have the same taxonomy of emotions, which is absolutely
not the case (Levy, 1973, 1984; Lutz, 1988; Wierzbicka, 1999,
2014). Just as each language relies on a different taxonomy across
hue, saturation, and luminance to delineate its color lexicon, so
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6 FISKE
different languages realize different taxonomies of emotion in their
emotion lexicons.4
However, in a given cultural framework, aspects of the social
relational situation are useful guidelines for identifying emotions,
and people are very sensitive to this. People also may be aware of
another cue, the motives generated by an emotion, and they typi-
cally attend to at least the positivity and negativity of the affect. So
the self-labeling of emotions is one indicator that researchers
should use, in conjunction with others, to identify emotions and
other internal states; we need to use every indicator available, since
none is individually sufficient.
Although we should listen attentively to informants/respon-
dents/participants, that doesn’t meant we should rely on their
speech directly, much less rely only on their speech, to formulate
the constructs we use to make sense of their speech, mental states,
or actions. In particular, using a vernacular lexeme as a scientific
construct fosters the injudicious adoption of self-report scales
consisting of synonyms of the vernacular lexeme. Self-report
scales assume that participants understand the vernacular lexeme
the way the researchers do, and share with each other a common
understanding of the vernacular lexeme. Furthermore, when basing
a construct on a vernacular lexeme, the researcher is likely to take
it for granted that respondents can readily and validly access,
attend to, encode, recall, and report the frequency or intensity of a
definite psychological process corresponding to the vernacular
lexeme. This problem isn’t in any way limited to cross-cultural
studies, and in that context, while back translation somewhat
ameliorates the problem, it by no means solves it.
For example, if one calls one’s construct being moved, one may
take it for granted that one’s participant-respondents directly know
when they themselves, or others, are moved—after all, they talk
about being moved. (Again, see Carruthers, 2011, for a cognitive
science philosopher’s argument that people have little or no direct
knowledge of their emotions, aside from their perceptual sources
and their valence). But if the researcher calls her construct kama
muta, she is more disposed to address the limits of introspection
and the liabilities of self-reporting via vernacular lexemes: She
must consider how to develop and incorporate a suite of comple-
mentary methods (for a related point, see Medin, Ojalehto, Marin,
& Bang, 2017).
Polysemy
One problem with using vernacular lexemes as scientific con-
structs is that people may use the same vernacular lexeme for two
or more distinct emotions. In an elegant study, Haslam and Born-
stein (1996) asked 291 Louisiana State University students,
“Please attempt to recall a time, as recently as possible, when you
felt resentful, hostile, or angry towards a ‘rival’ who seemed to be
benefitting from some desirable event, and when you also felt hurt,
insecure and unfairly treated by life” (p. 261). Replicating Parrott
and Smith (1993), Haslam and Bornstein found that their partici-
pants reported two distinct kinds of events, one corresponding to
romantic or sexual jealousy, the other to envy based on social
comparison. Two different taxometric methods both showed that
the responses fell into distinct taxa (categories); envy and jealousy
are not on a continuum with each other. “The distinctive features
of the two emotions compose discrete, bounded categories that
correspond closely to traditional definitions, envy is characterized
by feelings of shame, failure, dissatisfaction with self, and longing
for what another had, whereas jealousy is characterized by feelings
of betrayal, distrust, rejection, threat and loneliness” (p. 268).
One item in their instrument asked to what extent the respondent
had felt jealousy and another to what extent they had felt envy.
“The two terms were used as virtual synonyms, in the sense of
having a nearly identical reference, the items correlating .80 with
one another (p .0001)” (p. 263). Furthermore, ratings of jealousy
correlated equally strongly with both the sexual rivalry and social
comparison envy components (respectively derived from combin-
ing multiple items). Interestingly, although the analysis definitely
showed that the two emotions are distinct taxa, in about half of the
events that respondents described, both of the two emotions were
present. In any case, what this study shows is that the LSU
undergraduates in the mid1990s experienced two distinct emotions
without making any consistent lexical distinction in labeling them.
“The present study cautions strongly against assuming any
straightforward relationship between emotion terms and emotions
themselves” (p. 269). In other words, if emotion researchers were
to conceptualize and study jealousy based on the meaning of this
vernacular lexeme, they would conflate two quite different emo-
tional syndromes, and the same would be true if researchers
grounded a construct in the English vernacular word envy.
Likewise, in a study of participants in 12 nations, responding in
one of 10 languages, we found that people use awe and its nine
translations to refer to at least two distinct emotions (Zickfeld,
Schubert, Seibt, Blomster, et al., 2019). Participants watched a
randomly selected video that we had chosen to evoke kama muta.
In random order, they also watched another video depicting amaz-
ing, extraordinary actions—actions that pretesting had shown
make participants look up to impressive people. (They also
watched a third video to evoke sadness, and a fourth to evoke
amusement.) Analyses confirmed predictions that the four respec-
tive sets of videos evoked quite distinct emotions, as defined by
their divergent appraisals, motives, sensations, and various other
labels. Yet the means and distributions of ratings of the awe item
itself were virtually the same in response to kama muta videos and
to videos showing amazing, extraordinary actions. For the 12
nations combined, on scales from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a great deal),
the awe ratings of the kama muta videos, M  2.75 (SD  2.14),
and the awe ratings in of the impressive acts videos, M  2.67
(SD  2.13) were virtually identical (Cohen’s d  .04).5 In the
combined English speaking sample (US, U.K., and India) where
the item was the English word awe, the ratings of awe at the kama
muta videos M  3.43 (SD  2.10) were somewhat higher than
awe ratings of the awe/impressive actions, M  3.17 (SD  2.06),
though the difference was small (Cohen’s d  .13). In none of the
three nations did participants rate the impressive videos as evoking
more awe than the kama muta videos. These results show that
4 In most languages some color terms are also delineated with respect to
other visual properties such as texture, shininess, or iridescence.
5 These analyses were performed for the present paper. They are based
on the data collected for the cited paper, but were not reported in it. I thank
Janis Zickfeld for doing these analyses.
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7LEXICAL FALLACY
participants use awe and its translations in nine other languages as
a label for at least two different emotions.6
In sum, the polysemy of vernacular English lexemes such as
jealousy or awe makes them treacherous foundations for scientific
constructs. Moreover, many individual vernacular terms in any
given language encompass not just an emotion as such, but also
various moods, sentiments, attitudes, temperaments or traits, roles
or relationships, or even collective stereotypes. For example, a
Western person may be happy in any of these senses. In vernacular
speech and in the usage of many expert psychologists, little or no
distinction is made between momentary, fleeting emotions and
long-enduring moods, sentiments, traits, and so forth. Gervais and
Fessler (2017) have pointed out some of these conflations in
contempt. So when one speaks or writes of happiness, contempt, or
such vernacular lexemes, it’s just not clear whether the reference
is an emotion at all—an ambiguity that may mislead intuition,
muddy theory, and confuse scholarly communication.
The Ubiquity of Misunderstanding in Everyday
Discourse and Scientific Communication
Just because people have a conversation—or write, review,
read, and cite each other’s articles—doesn’t mean they actually
understand each other. Discourse researchers have found that
despite the presumption or polite pretense of mutual comprehen-
sion in everyday discourse, misunderstanding is commonplace
(House, Kasper, & Ross, 2003). “The positive value assigned to
understanding veils the conflict, ambiguity, and uncertainty that
are part-and-parcel of social and communicative worlds” (Bailey,
2004, p. 395). This failure to recognize mutual misunderstanding
occurs because, underneath the courteous façade of mutual under-
standing, “speakers and hearers appear to cooperate in constructing
messages that are ambiguous, that omit as much as they reveal. . . . An
important starting point is the observation that language use and
communication are in fact pervasively and even intrinsically
flawed, partial, and problematic” (Coupland, Weimann, & Giles,
1991:2–3; see also Kagan, 2007:9). That is, “flawed, partial, and
problematic” with respect to the information they convey; but
conveying information is only one aspect of everyday discourse
and writing—and often not the principal intention of the partici-
pants or the principal social result of speech. When one person
says, “That was so moving,” and the other says, “Yes, it was
heartwarming!,” they intend to sustain an affiliative relationship of
mutual affirmation, while claiming and accepting each other’s
claims that they are sensitive, affectionate people. They achieve
their social purpose regardless of whether either of them under-
stands precisely what the other means, or could even articulate just
what they themselves mean by their own utterances. Speaker and
listener can smoothly sustain the conversation without sharing a
common understanding of the denotation of moving or heartwarm-
ing.
But when scientists compare theories or evaluate empirical
claims about emotions or other psychological constructs, it is
essential that their communication occur without such slippage:
the information in the constructs, inferences, and reports must be
definitely and precisely articulable in the same way by all of the
parties in the interchange. This mutual understanding is problem-
atic, indeed nearly impossible, when scientists or philosophers rely
on vernacular lexemes to communicate key concepts.
Much has been written about the necessity for precise terminology in
science and especially in psychology. . . . The requirement is partic-
ularly important in personology [the study of personality], where it is
all too easy to label a trait or other variable with a word from everyday
language. When this is done, both the writer and reader are likely to
accept the term without question, each having some acquaintance with
it and many associations with it, and finding it easy to recall illustra-
tions from his personal experience or the observations of others. A
theorist may feel that he is communicating well when he uses the
common term, and the reader may feel that he understands the
theorist’s writings, even though a cursory analysis of the word indi-
cates that its meaning is rather vague and to some extent ambiguous
or that it has several alternative meanings. In addition, the reader’s
personal associations and connotations for the term may be unlike
those of the theorist. . . . [Clearly formulated] conceptual pictures are
rarely if ever available. . . . For instance, what is anxiety? . . . when
these enter into discussions, we find that we differ from our associates
not only on the central meaning of each abstraction, but also on what
should be included in the total definition. (Donald W. Fiske, 1971, pp.
90–91)
Dissimilar Synonyms and Contrasting
Pseudotranslations of Anger
In addition to their ambiguity, dialectical and ever-changing
usage, and polysemy, English vernacular lexemes are problematic
foundations for scientific constructs of emotions for two other
reasons. First, there are myriad overlapping English emotion terms
that, although partially synonymous with many others, each have
different prototypes and boundaries. Considering any cloud of
semisynonyms, there is no self-evident bases for adopting one term
for a scientific construct while ignoring most of the rest. Second,
the lexicon of each language constitutes a taxonomy of affect that
differs from the taxonomy of every other language: the emotion
terms from a given language do not map one-to-one onto the
emotion terms of any other language. For example, on the vital
differences between English shame and Spanish vergüenza, see
Hurtado de Mendoza, Fernández-Dols, Parrott, and Carrera
(2010). There is no nonarbitrary basis for picking the lexically
instantiated taxonomy of any particular language, such as English,
as the grounds for identifying natural kinds of emotions. So pre-
sumably no emotion lexicon fortuitously cuts nature at its joints.
Although there is neither space nor need to examine these two
problems with every English vernacular lexeme that emotion sci-
entists have adopted as a scientific construct, let’s look closely at
the problems with one English vernacular lexeme that, as we saw
in Table 1, has been widely reified as a basic emotion construct,
anger. Let’s suppose that we rely on a thesaurus of contemporary
English to look for words in one cloud of nominal synonyms. For
anger, the OED online thesaurus gives the following synonyms:
annoyance, vexation, exasperation, crossness, irritation, irritabil-
ity, indignation, pique, displeasure, resentment, rage, fury, wrath,
outrage, temper, road rage, air rage, irascibility, ill temper, dys-
pepsia, spleen, ill humor, tetchiness, testiness, waspishness. The-
saurus.com gives an overlapping but different list of anger syn-
6 Derivatives of awe have additional meanings, as well. As a native
speaker of English, I note that people use awesome to indicate pleasure,
approval, congratulations, or shared excitement/pride. Awesomeness is not
about either awe or kama muta. And of course, neither is awful in the
present day.
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8 FISKE
onyms: acrimony, animosity, annoyance, antagonism, displeasure,
enmity, exasperation, fury, hatred, impatience, indignation, ire,
irritation, outrage, passion, rage, resentment, temper, violence,
chagrin, choler, conniption, dander, disapprobation, distemper,
gall, huff, infuriation, irascibility, irritability, miff, peevishness,
petulance, pique, rankling, soreness, stew, storm, tantrum, tiff.
Moving into more informal language, onlineslangdictionary.com
gives another list of anger synonyms: being ticked off, feeling
grumpy, being offended, in a huff, fly off the handle, at the end of
one’s rope, steamed, cheesed off, bent out of shape, at the end of
one’s rope, in a huff, in a snit, and so on. None of these words
means quite the same thing as any of the others; that is, people use
them a bit differently. Authoritative sources differ on which ones
are synonyms of anger, implying lack of consensus on their
definitions and distinctions.
Now then, if we assume, like most emotion researchers, that
vernacular lexemes correspond to psychological states, does each
of these synonyms denote an emotion? Do these lexemes represent
subtypes in some larger category, and if so, how do we identify
that category? Furthermore, these synonym lists are snapshots at
one point in time, but languages change; is every new emotional
lexeme that emerges a new emotion? If we do not construe every
lexeme as a distinct and valid emotion construct, using vernacular
lexemes as scientific constructs entails making decisions about
which English lexemes are correct and which are, what, just
words? Ontologically, this must be a principled choice, but re-
searchers rarely articulate, much less justify, the principles behind
their choices of which vernacular lexemes to adopt as constructs
and which to simply ignore—or which to include as items in an
inventory measuring anger.
So, in the first place, reifying the English vernacular lexeme
anger as a scientific construct is problematic because it is arbitrary
to choose anger as the basis for a construct instead of annoyance,
vexation, rage, pissed, or all of them.
Anger  Urulu  Song  Liget  Zlos´c´
It is essential to recognize the diversity . . . and to abandon the idea
that all languages must have words for something as “basic” and as
“natural” as “sadness,” “anger,” “fear,” “happiness,” “disgust,” and
“surprise.” (Wierzbicka, 1999, p. 24)
The idea that there may be an infinite variety of emotion categories
operating across cultures is not incompatible with the view there may
be some universal patterns of emotional organization. The crucial
point that if there are universal patterns they cannot be captured by
means of English folk categories such as anger, sadness, or disgust,
but only in terms of universal human concepts. (Wierzbicka, 1999, p.
28)
Using a vernacular lexeme as the basis for a scientific construct
also entails a decision about which language’s lexeme(s) one
selects. So, for example, using the English vernacular lexeme
anger to denote a scientific construct makes ontological sense on
just one of two contradictory grounds. The first possible grounds
for using anger is positing that one could equally well adopt a
corresponding vernacular lexeme from any language because, one
assumes, every language has a lexeme that is a straightforward
one-to-one translation of anger. But this is not the case, as Wier-
zbicka (1999, 2014) and Fernández-Dols and Russell (2003) have
earlier pointed out and I illustrate more extensively in this section.
The second possible grounds for using the English anger as a
scientific construct is that one posits that it uniquely and fortu-
itously corresponds to a natural kind, whereas no vernacular lex-
eme from any other of the 7,000 languages of the world happens
to do so. That is, one could take it for granted that all the languages
that lack a word precisely corresponding to anger are simply
deficient. So the question is, does every language have a vernac-
ular lexeme that denotes precisely what anger denotes, no more
and no less and with exactly the same defining features?
The nearest approximate translations of anger in the language of
the Utkuhikhalingmuit (Inuit, Eskimo; hereafter, Utku) is urulu,
which means “to feel, express, or arouse hostility or annoyance.
The term may also be used as an expression of sympathy at the
misfortune of others” (Briggs, 1970, p. 329). Note immediately
that Utku use urulu for what provokes the emotion and also for the
affective response to it. Angry could also be translated as qiquq,
whose literal meaning is “to be clogged up with foreign material”
(p. 329, 335). A crucial aspect of these vernacular lexemes is “the
Utku belief that angry thoughts can kill, simply of their own force.
The wish to harm, in other words, is as real, and potentially lethal,
an attack as a physical assault” (p. 332). If Utku scientists relied on
urulu or qiquq as the basis for a scientific construct, the transgres-
sive and potentially fatal aspects of it would be necessary features.
People in lots of other cultures similarly take it for granted that
immediate, imminent harm to others is a basic feature of their
anger-like constructs. Even today people in a great many cultures
believe in witches, that is, people fear women whose envy, greed,
or other malevolent affect alone, without the use of magic or any
other material means, can result in the target’s misfortune, illness,
or death (for the classic account, see Evans-Pritchard, 1937). One
cannot equate the English vernacular lexeme anger with a lexeme
that denotes an immanently lethal aspect of the person.
Such emotion lexemes are diametrically opposite to song, the
nearest translation of anger in the language of the Micronesian
Ifaluk (Lutz, 1988; there are also other, less culturally salient
words for other sorts of anger). Song is a prosocial emotion akin to
righteous indignation; intrinsic to the concept is that the affect is
justified. “To become justifiably angry [song] is to advance the
possibilities for peace and well-being on the island, for it is to
identify instances of behavior that threaten the moral order” (Lutz,
1988:156–157). Although anyone can feel song at anyone, the
prototype is the song of a higher ranking person toward a lower
ranking person for whom the higher ranking person is responsible.
It is the moral and social duty of superiors to be song when
subordinates do something wrong—that is, something that jeopar-
dizes the harmony or wellbeing of the community. Hence song is
essential to the maintenance of the cordial, caring social relations
that are necessary in this small insular community. “People told me
on many different occasions that a parent must at times become
justifiably angry [song] with his or her child, ‘or the child will not
know the difference between right and wrong’” (p. 165).
To say that oneself or another is song is a moral assertion that
the target has committed a transgression, and entails the target’s
responding with metagu, fear, and consequently amending her
behavior. That is, metagu is distress at having aggravated an
authority whose leadership and beneficent control one depends on.
Prototypically, “a taboo is violated, a traditional law is disobeyed,
and people point not directly to the law but to the song of the
chiefs” who are the moral leaders of the community (p. 158).
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9LEXICAL FALLACY
“Song would not have its effect on the moral life of the community
were fear [metagu] not to be evoked by it” (p. 167). However, a
person who is song is not expected to, and virtually never does,
physically aggress against the target—the metagu that the target
feels is not concern that bodily harm will come to them as a result
of the other’s song (p. 176). In addition, song also denotes a kind
of sadness, including the state that would motivate self-injury or
suicide.7 For an Ifaluk scholar basing her scientific constructs on
her vernacular lexeme, song, these features would seem intuitively
obvious; she would simply take them for granted.
Obviously, adopting urulu as the template for a scientific con-
struct yields a construct that differs from anger, and both yield
constructs that contrast with the template that song provides. Is
there any logical reason to adopt one rather than another? Should
we assume, as Utku do, that anger is inherently and dangerously
antisocial? Or, as Ifaluk do, that anger is inherently and benefi-
cently prosocial, that it is prototypically an emotion of legitimate
authorities, and whose prototype includes violation of traditional
taboos?
Now consider the language of the Ilongot of Luzon, Philippines,
in which the nearest translation of anger is liget, a lexeme which
incorporates passion, drive, purposefulness, and determination
(Rosaldo, 1980). More broadly, liget denotes the force, energy, and
intensity of people, but also waterfalls and rapids, strong winds,
chili pepper, and such. In Ilongot culture, liget is socially essential
and admirable, even wonderful. Evoked by envy at the accom-
plishments of others, as well as “insults, slights, and other intima-
tions of inequality” (Rosaldo, 1980, p. 46), liget drives people to
work assiduously to match their peers, whether in horticulture or
hunting. It is what makes people productive contributors to the
community. Liget is the energy required to work hard, the drive to
dance well, the fierceness to perform dangerous tasks such as
pollarding tall trees. Without liget, people would accomplish noth-
ing important or difficult. Properly oriented and modulated by the
wisdom of the elders, liget is admirable because it is the will to do
what must be done.
The prototypical script for liget arises from the ‘envy’ of young
men at the prestige of mature men, combined with ‘grief’ at the
death of a loved one. Grief is a burden, weighing one down,
sapping the will. It also has a humiliating flavor. So when someone
dies, grieving young men prevail upon elders to lead them in a
head-hunting raid in which they kill the first person(s) they en-
counter and cut off their head(s). Grabbing and tossing a severed
head to the ground in exultant liget transforms the headhunter’s
grief into ‘pride’ and ‘joy’. It does not matter who the victim is. It
does not matter much who disables the victim, who kills the
victim, or who severs the head. It is the triumphant man who seizes
the head and tosses it to the ground who is admired and feted. A
man who has tossed a head returns in glory to the village to be
lauded by all, and thereafter proudly wears ornaments to display
his feat. Tossing a head makes a man the equal of those he
previously looked up to with envy, and it makes a man a desirable
husband. Younger men and those who failed to toss a head envy
the head-tossers, building up liget that will motivate future head-
hunting.
An Ilongot scholar basing an emotion construct on liget would
take it for granted that the emotion it typically driven by envy
(especially at the head-tossing accomplishments of others), is the
quintessential source of pride, motivates essential work, is neces-
sary to an actively purposeful life, assuages grief, and, when
properly channeled by wise elders, is the essential fount of the
glorious violence and the pride that one is consequently entitled to
feel. If Ilongots had dominated theory and research on emotions,
presumably they would have taken for granted that liget is a basic
emotion, rather than anger. Liget is the nearest translation of the
English anger, but the two terms differ radically: Should we reify
one as a universal, basic emotion while we just ignore the other?
Which one?
Even within one language family, such as Indo-European, there
are substantial differences among the nearest translations of anger.
The Polish lexemes that are closest to anger are zlos´c´ and geniew,
but neither could be used to translate many common uses of anger
in English discourse; conversely, anger would not capture many of
the common uses of zlos´c´ or geniew (Wierzbicka, 1999).
One does not have to take ethnographers’ or linguists’ word for
it that English vernacular anger is not a universally recognized
concept. Although in the Kilivila language of the Trobriand Is-
landers of Melanesia there is a word, leya, that roughly translates
anger, only one of 32 Trobriand participants spontaneously used
leya to label the emotion in a face that Ekman had photographed
and selected as a clear and definite example of anger (Crivelli,
Russell, Jarillo, & Fernández-Dols, 2017; the face was of a person
in the Fore tribe, another Melanesian society).
So why should we build a scientific construct on the English
vernacular lexeme anger, and indeed consider it a basic emotion,
rather than basing a scientific construct on liget, song, urulu,
qiquq, leya, zlos´c´, geniew, or some other more or less related term
from any random language? Reifying the English word anger is
pure linguistic chauvinism—it presumes that English, alone among
languages, fortuitously captures a scientifically valid taxonomy of
emotions. Does the English lexicon get emotions right, cutting
nature at its joints, whereas 7,000 other languages fail to do so?8
I use the English vernacular lexeme anger as the index term for
this discussion because it has been reified and adopted by emotion
scholars as a basic emotion. Note, however, that if one compares
lexemes across languages, the approximate translations one finds
depend on the particular language from which one initially draws
the index lexeme. Translation is asymmetrical. So a search for
translations of song would lead to lexemes in other languages
related to morally appropriate disapproval that promotes social
harmony. A search for approximate translations of liget would lead
to lexemes denoting energy, drive, or determination motivated by
‘envy’, and the emotional source of glorious violence against
random victims. Depending on the language whose lexeme one
starts with, one will find quite different patterns of correspondence
and difference. This alone should make one leery of adopting the
7 Some African languages also use a single lexeme to encompass much
of both what English-speakers would call anger and what they would call
sadness (Russell, 1991).
8 Note that I am not taking the cultural or linguistic constructionist
position that because different cultures use very different lexemes and have
different emotion scripts, their emotions as such are fundamentally differ-
ent. Culture and language deeply inform and orient emotions, sensitize
people to valued and disvalued emotions, and construct practices, institu-
tions, roles, arts, and artifacts whose function is to evoke and direct specific
emotions and to blunt and reorient others. But I do not believe that culture
and language simply fabricate emotions from scratch.
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10 FISKE
vernacular lexeme of any language as the basis for a scientific
construct.
In sum, one more reason why vernacular emotion lexemes
cannot provide a valid source of scientific emotion constructs is
because within and across languages there are too many vernacular
lexemes and no principled way to choose among them. William
James (1890, p. 1134) summed it up:
This is all I have to say about the emotions. If one should seek to name
each particular one of them of which the human heart is the seat, it is
plain that the limit to their number would lie in the introspective
vocabulary of the seeker, each race of men having found names for
some shade of feeling which other races have left undiscriminated.
The Lexicon of Each Language Comprises a
Culturally Unique Taxonomy
The arbitrariness of reifying the vernacular lexemes of one
language as scientific constructs stems not only from the differ-
ences in meaning of the most nearly corresponding vernacular
lexemes across languages, but also from the fact that a lexeme in
a given language may have no corresponding lexeme at all in
another language. Speakers of Hindi-Urdu in general find it diffi-
cult to come up with any way to label kama muta experiences. In
his meticulous depth interviews and participant observation, Rob-
ert Levy found that village Tahitians have no specific lexeme and
no particular concept corresponding to the English vernacular guilt
(Levy, 1973, p. 342). Moreover, Tahitians have no lexeme or
concept corresponding to the English vernacular sadness, even the
sadness of the loss of a loved one (Levy, 1973, pp. 303–306). So
French-speaking Tahitians understand triste to mean tired, lethar-
gic. Conversely, unlike contemporary English speakers, Tahitians
have a definite lexeme, mehameha, for the spine-tingling, weird,
uneasy experience of the uncanny. The prototypical situation for
mehameha is when a solitary person outside the village at night
senses something strange, unnatural, incorporeal (Levy, 1973, pp.
151–152). So if one built emotion theory on traditional Tahitian,
the list of basic emotions would not correspond with a list derived
from the lexicon of contemporary English (see also Levy, 1984).
Likewise, a language that has lexemes for an affect or trait in
certain contexts may have no accessible, consensual, consistent
vernacular lexeme for it in some other contexts. As I mentioned,
English, French, German, and Norwegian speakers have no ver-
nacular lexeme for the kama muta evoked by cute animals, but
despite the lack of a label for the emotion, the other four features
that characterize kama muta are definitely present and highly
correlated with each other when participants look at cute animal
images and videos (Steinnes et al., 2019). From what we have been
able to discern from interviews, ethnographies, and texts, Arabic
speakers have a number of salient lexemes for kama muta expe-
rienced in Sufi worship, and in musical performances with roots in
Sufism (Frembgen, 2008; Frishkopf, 2001; Kapchan, 2009; Nasr,
1972/1980, 1999; Racy, 2003). But speakers of the Arabic dialects
we have interviewed apparently do not have any accessible lexeme
for the kama muta evoked by, say, a Pixar movie.
So the taxonomies manifested in vernacular lexemes differ
across languages. Does the taxonomy of one language fortuitously
cut nature at its joints, while 7000 other languages fail to do so?
The only objectively reasonable conclusion is that no language
does so. This is a challenge to theories that see the labeling of
sensations as the essence of emotions, because labeling theories
(Barrett, 2017; Damasio, 1994; James, 1890) imply that a person
does not experience emotions that they cannot name. Such theories
therefore also seem to imply that for every distinct emotion word
in any language there is a discrete emotion—and hence there are
hundreds of thousands of emotions, with speakers of each lan-
guage ipso facto experiencing different emotions.
Vernacular Lexemes are Performatives
It is also problematic to build scientific emotion constructs on
the dictionary of any language because vernacular lexemes are not
simply constative references to preexistent realities. Technically
speaking, lexemes have not only locutionary functions (denoting
things that are assumed to exist independent of the discourse), but
also illocutionary and perlocutionary functions. That is, all utter-
ances have performative aspects: speech does things. (For emo-
tional things language does, see Majid, 2012a; for analogous
illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of nonlinguistic emotional
expressions, see e.g., Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018; Fernández-Dols &
Russell, 2017; Scarantino, 2017). As we observed when consider-
ing words roughly translatable as anger, vernacular lexemes are
often evaluatively loaded; often to some degree the use of an
emotional vernacular lexeme, in particular, is an act of social
judgment and an attempt to influence action and shape relation-
ships. When I say, Wow! You’re angry, my utterance goes beyond
labeling; it is an illocutionary act of criticism, control, resistance,
or rejection of my interlocutor’s angry utterance. If I say, When
you do that, it makes me sad, and angry, I’m indicting the ad-
dressee and telling them to stop doing something. Sad and angry
have perlocutionary functions; they are not merely constative. This
is all very well in everyday discourse, but it is not only inappro-
priate to scientific or other explanatory discourse, it may lead to
interpretive bias and observational blindness. When I say that “I
am moved by your concern”, or “I’m touched at your thoughtful
present,” my utterance itself fulfills a social obligation to express
thanks. And it is a claim to be feeling grateful, and hence to be a
socially sensitive, appreciative person. Likewise, when I say to
someone, “I could see that you were moved by the tiger’s tender-
ness toward the sleeping fawn it was cuddling,” I am praising the
addressee for loving animals (and hence being a loving person),
being in touch with her maternal feelings, and for being openly
expressive of this (‘feminine’) sentiment. And I am praising the
tiger. Perhaps my praise is instrumentally motivated, to ingratiate
myself. Hence if we use moved as a scientific construct, we are
liable to confuse the locutionary, perlocutionary and illocutionary
functions of utterances of the vernacular word. That could easily
lead us to assume that people who report being moved are sensitive
and disposed to gratefulness. We thus may be blinded to the mental
states of people using the lexeme merely to present themselves in
a socially desirable way, to reinforce a social relationship, or to be
polite. That is, when people report feeling something, they may not
actually be reporting an emotion as such.
More insidiously, if we adopt moved as a scientific construct we
will be prone to think of it as a prosocial emotion. That may make
it difficult to recognize the same emotion when Hitler’s beer-hall
speeches evoked kama muta, generating solidarity in listeners and
prompting them to anti-Semitic violence. It may make it difficult
to recognize the popular kama muta sentiment the Japanese high
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11LEXICAL FALLACY
command in World War II evidently wanted kamikaze pilots to
evoke. Use of technical nomenclature circumvents such miscon-
ceptual traps.
One final problem with relying on vernacular lexemes as the
source of our scientific constructs: in any given language, many
important aspects of meaning are not lexicalized. “Languages
differ enormously in the concepts that they provide ready-coded in
grammar and lexicon” (Evans & Levinson, 2009). In particular, in
any particular language there are likely to be emotional states that,
although they are culturally recognized and culturally informed,
are not marked by discrete lexemes. In addition to nonlinguistic
performances of emotions, they may be linguistically conveyed in
whole or in part syntactically, by verbal modality, by registers, by
tone and stress, and so forth. This is certainly true of English,
where emotions are often marked by slowing down or speeding up
speech, by speaking loudly or softly, using a raised or lowered
pitch, by speaking like a young child, enunciating more or less
carefully, by using nicknames and diminutives versus formal terms
of address, by winking or smirking while speaking, and so forth.
You know the emotion she means to convey when your mother
says to you, speaking slowly and pronouncing each phoneme
distinctly, “Mr. James Peter Martin, come here right now!” Basing
scientific constructs on the vernacular lexemes of a language
means ignoring any emotions which that particular language marks
mostly by means other than discrete lexemes.
Is the lexical fallacy limited to constructs of emotions? I do not
think so. As the earlier quotation made clear, Donald Fiske (1971,
1981) analyzed the pitfalls of using vernacular words as scientific
personality trait constructs. Then Susan Fiske (1995) raised the
issue for all of social psychology. As I write this, I’ve just come
from a stimulating conference on violence. Participants pointed out
that people speak of violence when referring to the destruction
wrought by hurricanes, meteorite impacts that cause extinctions,
predators killing prey, warfare, intensity of sorrow and other
emotions, damage to words or institutions, and the unintended
harm that ultimately results from social practices such as purchas-
ing clothing at the lowest price. Others argued that however much
harm results, an act is not violence if the actors intentions conform
to the highest moral standards—apparently they meant “contem-
porary elite Western moral standards.” Such construals of violence
are lexicographically valid: they indeed characterize common uses
of the English lexeme. But the sum of these diverse usages do not
constitute anything remotely like a natural kind. There are no
substantial common features, no common internal structure, and
no commonality of causes or consequences of, respectively,
storms, meteoritic impact extinctions, predation, capitalistic sweat-
shops, disturbing sorrow, speech undermining linguistic conven-
tions, and warfare. Consequently, violence is a pernicious scien-
tific construct—unless used in an explicitly stipulated, clearly
delineated technical sense (e.g., A. P. Fiske & Rai, 2015). And
even then, Tage Rai and I would have been less vulnerable to
misunderstanding if we had avoided using a vernacular lexeme,
violence, to denote our construct and instead called it, say, υ.
How to Construct Scientific Constructs,
and What Happens When One Does
In sum, the problems with using vernacular lexemes as the basis
for identifying scientific constructs are that vernacular lexemes:
1. Are ambiguous, having no definite, precisely delineated
meaning in any instance and having different meanings in
different dialects, periods, and speech contexts, while also
being used differently by different speaker/writers and in a
variety of ways by any one speaker on different occasions;
2. Are often specific to particular cultural contexts, such that,
for example, the same emotion has different names in
different contexts, and may have no name in certain con-
texts;
3. Rather than denoting just one entity, are often used indis-
criminately to denote multiple, distinct affects, states, or
traits, as well as attitudes and judgments;
4. Are often used in illocutionary and perlocutionary ways to
perform social and discourse functions, without having any
referential function at all;
5. Have illusory facticity, leading to fallacious reification, as if
every word, such as unicorn or the vapors necessarily
designates something real and scientifically valid;
6. Foster the complacent assumption that participant-respondents
are aware of the psychological entity when it occurs in them,
can access and reflect on its operation, and are able to assess
its intensity and frequency, so that that self-report labeling
alone is sufficient to measure it;
7. Have unrecognized evaluative loadings that bias scientists’
expectations about where the entity will occur and what causes
and consequences it has;
8. When used to designate a scientific construct, the choice of a
lexeme from among many partial synonyms in a given lan-
guage is usually arbitrary and unjustified;
9. A given universal construct, such as kama muta, may be
absent from the lexicon of a given language, although the
psychological state actually occurs in members of the speech
community;
10. Have culture-specific, language-specific meanings focused on
unique prototypes, incorporating unique features, or including
specific practices (e.g., headhunting), while excluding other
features and instances that are included in the lexemes of other
languages—so that the adoption of a vernacular lexeme and
hence the folk taxonomy of a given culture is arbitrary, paro-
chial, and implicitly chauvinistic.
In addition, innumerable scientifically valid entities just do not
have any vernacular name in any language—at least until scientists
identify and technically define the entity (and then, in some in-
stances, their names become common parlance—albeit used with
less precision and validity than in scientific usage). Scholars who
rely on the common lexicon of any language for their constructs
will fail to see anything that does not have a common name.
In sum, “The history of science teaches us that common-sense
conceptualizations can be improved and ultimately replaced with
scientifically honed ones” (Fernández-Dols & Russell, 2003).
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12 FISKE
Inductively Deriving Scientific Constructs From
Observations in Diverse Contexts Around the World
If we are not to get our constructs from our lexicon, where shall
we find them? It is not in the purview of this article to provide
comprehensive guidelines for emotion research methodology
(much less to propose a general theory of emotions), which in any
case I am not remotely qualified to offer. But having critiqued a
pervasive epistemological fallacy, it is incumbent on me to show
that there is at least one way to avoid it. Indeed, there are many
fruitful approaches, and we need them all—their complementarity
is crucial. But to show that it is possible to avoid committing this
fallacy, let me briefly spell out one way around it—the way I
adumbrated in the opening pages of this article.
In my view, if we want to understand the real world, we should
begin by observing it. Not merely by asking respondents to tell us
about it, but by looking for ourselves. This should include direct
observation in natural settings, and not just looking from the
sidelines: participant observation catalyzes experiential insight
into what we see others do.9 But the world is far too big and too
diverse to rely on direct observation alone, and we cannot see for
ourselves how people lived in the past. So to come up with a
description that is valid for the species, we need to read other
observers’ accounts of places and times that we cannot go to in
person. The systematic comparison and contrast of ethnographic
(and historical) accounts is called ethnology. It is the only way to
discern the full range of human action and experience, and the only
way to begin to distinguish their universal aspects from their
culturally informed and historically situated aspects. Ethnology is
especially crucial because contemporary Western life and many
aspects of its psychology—particularly that of comparatively well-
off, educated people—are atypical of Homo sapiens (Henrich,
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Medin et al., 2017).
In short, before we can explain anything, we need to begin by
describing it as it occurs in its natural environments. Using all
available means, we then try to discern patterns in everyday real
life. What features are always associated in the same configura-
tion, what varies, how and when do those variations occur? This is
pattern-seeking induction, the deep foundation of all science. In-
duction is the search for natural kinds, including, in Homo sapiens,
the many natural kinds that are intrinsically informed by culture
(Fiske, 2000), such as, for example, kama muta.
How much observation of what kinds do we need to do? That
depends on many things, of course, but as a ball park rule of
thumb, I might provisionally suggest the ones laid out in Table 2,
for two levels of confidence:
This requires a bit of explanation. Above all, I am suggesting
that to discover natural kinds, one needs to begin by observing
naturally occurring behavior in natural settings in everyday life
outside the lab. That is, by observing what people do in a great
variety of settings that the researcher has not created, using data
collection methods that are minimally intrusive. By “features” I
mean aspects of the emotion that are generally characteristic and,
with respect to at least most similar emotions, fairly distinctive. By
“methods” I mean maximally independent ways of assessing the
features—methods that have not just minimal error and bias, but
that differ from each other in the likely sources of error and types
of bias (Campbell & D. W. Fiske, 1959). “Ethnographic sources”
should be academic monographs and articles, mostly based on over
a year of participant observation by fieldworkers who fluently
speak the native language. Cultures included in the sample should
be primarily non-WEIRD, of course, but also from diverse culture
areas, subsistence types, and levels of social complexity. Wherever
possible, “historical sources” should include some primary sources
from multiple languages, and avoid use of sources that have
substantially influenced each other. “Language families” (e.g.,
Indo-European, Sino-Tibetan) should ideally be nonadjacent, and
typological analysis should show that the lexemes are not likely to
be cognates or otherwise based on borrowing between the respec-
tive language families. “Focused participant observation” should
consist in each case of at least 100 hours of fieldwork in which the
researchers engaged as far as feasible in the practices they studied;
it should include interviews with native participants about what the
fieldworker participated in and observed, but not consist primarily
of interviewing outside of the context of the practice being studies.
“Unstructured interviews” should be as open as possible, with the
goal of exploring how respondents perceive and evaluate their
experience. “Fiction,” and so forth, should consist of casting a
wide net to collect not just narratives but nonlinguistic depictions
of the emotion.
It goes without saying that there is nothing magical about the
proposed numbers of cultures, languages, ethnographies, and so
forth; they are merely suggestive, as provisional starting points for
discussion and evaluation. However, it is equally self-evident that
it is essential to draw on material of many different kinds from
different cultures, different historical periods, different languages,
and different methodologies. Moreover, one needs to compare the
patterns that emerge from each or most of these ways of observing,
because all are limited and biased in many respects. Natural kinds
come into view as resonance among homologous patterns revealed
by diverse methods of observing. So for example, the reason to
believe that kama muta is one emotion, occurring across the
infinite diversity of cultures and contexts, is that we can identify
the coherence of its five features when we read ethnographies and
novels, participate in worship and Alcoholics Anonymous, inter-
view Norwegians and North Africans, et cetera. The co-occurrence
of these five features, assessed in any of these observational ways
(and in experiments) identifies the emotion, or in an interesting
sense, at the present level of development of the theory, is the
emotion.
We have observed kama muta in all of these channels beyond
the level of “provisionally persuasive”. Other than kama muta, I do
not know of any emotion construct that has been built by imple-
menting this set of observational methods even to the level of
“intriguing” on all of them. That certainly doesn’t mean that no
other emotion constructs are valid! But at the least it implies that
many promising new emotion constructs could be uncovered by
doing this sort of multimethod observational search and inductive
derivation of patterns across maximally varied natural contexts.
Because Table 2 proposes guidelines for observing natural be-
havior to discover patterns, it does not address what one should do
9 Of course, like every method, ethnographic methods yield data with
both systematic bias and noisy error. So, in the first place, one needs to
compare reports from different observers who likely have different implicit
biases. And one needs to complement observational methods with all sorts
of other data about real world behavior, while comparing natural behavior
with behavior in clean, simplified, controlled experimental situations.
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to experimentally test hypotheses or do other artificial and con-
trolled studies, how one should randomly sample, or what proce-
dures to use to statistically analyze data. That panoply of methods
is absolutely essential to pin down the constructs—but it is not
how one should begin to identify natural kinds.
In this article I have also ignored biological methods because I
do not see much promise for discovering natural kinds though
existing methods of investigating hormones, brains, or physiology.
And although it’s obvious that hormones, brains, and physiology
are essential concurrent and evolved substrates for emotional pro-
cesses, emotions are in no way reducible to their biology or their
evolutionary function. But it seems pretty clear that emotions
(properly identified) are functional systems, supported by, gener-
ating, or at least integrated with biological processes of some sort.
So if we could do real-time measurement of the biology of what
we think is kama muta in worship and found that it is quite distinct
from the biology of what we think is kama muta while watching
YouTube videos, we’d definitely say, “Hold everything! We have
an issue here—an apparent challenge to our theory! We have to
stop and figure out what’s going on with this.” Precisely as we
would say if we found clear instances where the other four features
of kama muta were definitely present but there was definitely no
sudden intensification of communal sharing.
In contrast to what I am offering here as a way around the
lexical fallacy, most psychologists and other social scientists typ-
ically use deductive approaches to formulate constructs. This can
be fruitful, provided that the deductions are solidly based in
precisely specified and well-validated assumptions and are abso-
lutely rigorous in their logical derivation. The deductive approach
to generating scientific constructs seems more elegant than the
inductive approach, and, because, in its simpler forms, it is so
much quicker, it appears to be easier. The problem is that the grand
theories that we have of human evolution, behavioral ecology,
society, and culture provide too few constraints to permit one to
deduce specific mechanisms. The grand theories capture only
certain broad aspects of nature, aspects which are insufficiently
specified to determine the particular mechanisms though which
they actually operate. In any case it is easy for theorists to be led
astray if they unreflectively assume that their deductions must lead
to constructs intuitively corresponding to vernacular lexemes. In-
deed, this result is difficult to avoid, given that the deductive
reasoning in much of social science is in part or entirely formu-
lated in vernacular terms.
Alternatively, or in conjunction with other approaches, con-
structs can be statistically generated through such methods as
factor analyses, cluster analysis, machine learning, and the like.
However, associations among the responses may result, in whole
or in part, from the respondents’ folk psychology, together with
their reification of their vernacular lexemes. That is, in rating a
person’s personality, for example, respondents may refer not only
to the targets’ observed behaviors but to the respondent’s own
interpretations of the similarities in meanings of the vernacular
lexemes that comprise the items (D’Andrade, 1965, 1974; Sh-
weder, 1975; Shweder & D’Andrade, 1979). The respondent (like
the researcher who composed the items) assumes that the vernac-
ular lexemes correspond to natural categories of behavior. So, for
example, having rated a person as high on friendliness, the respon-
dent, unsure how to rate the person on kindness, is likely to reason
(explicitly or implicitly), “well, if she is friendly, she must also be
kind, because friendly and kind are very similar in meaning.” To
the extent that respondents use similarity in meaning of vernacular
lexemes to respond to the items, then correlations or clusters of
items will result from the synonymy of meanings of the lexemes,
not the co-occurrence of the traits. And the vernacular lexemes that
form the items do not correspond to natural kinds—so we cannot
map the world by mapping associations among word meanings.
Beyond their characteristic features, constructs must be defined
in part or entirely by their causal or functional relations with other
well-understood constructs: Posttraumatic stress disorder is, min-
imally, something caused by trauma. Kama muta is evoked by the
sudden intensification of a communal sharing relationship. Scien-
tific constructs are embedded in theories.
It is worth keeping in mind that however a construct is identi-
fied, a valid and fully delineated definition need not consist of a list
of necessary and sufficient features. Some invaluable constructs,
such as the disorders identified in recent editions of the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, are quite clearly defined by, for example, stip-
ulating that a person has the disorder if and only if they have at
least one of the three symptoms from category 1, three or more of
the eight symptoms from category 2, and the person is either
disabled by the condition or has had it for more than X weeks. This
is a polythetic category. There is nothing fuzzy about such a
category; it is not based on amorphous family resemblance or
graded similarity to a prototype. Provided there are valid means to
assess the symptoms, a definite determination can be made in each
Table 2
Observing Natural Behavior to Discover Patterns Reflecting Natural Kinds of Emotions
Measure Intriguing Provisionally persuasive
Characteristic features 3 5
Methods of assessing each feature 2 4
Ethnographic sources 10 on three continents 100, including three subsistence types from 10 culture areas
Historical sources 10 on two continents over 300 years 70 on four continents over 1500 years
Language families 2 on different continents 6 on four continents
Focused participant observation 4 in three practices 20 in 15 practices
Unstructured interviews 30 in two languages 150 in five languages
Fiction, poetry, drama, visual media, art, autobiography,
journalism, blogs, social media 50 sources 300 sources
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case whether a person does or does not have a given disorder at a
given point in time; there is no ambiguity.10 Many good scientific
constructs may be validly defined in this polythetic manner.
Considering the thesis of this article, it is essential to keep in
mind the logic of argument; the lexical fallacy is still a fallacy
regardless of the validity of kama muta theory and regardless of
the empirical support for the kama muta construct. Kama muta
theory as it stands would be falsified if the features that we posit
to characterize it do not cohere consistently. For example, if, in a
well-verified set of instances, all of the other features of kama
muta are definitely present in the absence of any sudden intensi-
fication of communal sharing, the theory is false. (See, e.g.,
exactly this claim—which we think is mistaken—in Cullhed, in
press, who challenges kama muta theory on precisely that
grounds.) My colleagues and I welcome critiques of kama muta
theory, improvements on it, and studies that explore all aspects of
it. We believe that the kama muta construct provides a useful
prototype of one approach that avoids the lexical fallacy. But it’s
not yet a fully mature, fully explored, fully validated construct. In
any case I hope that readers of this article will not let any doubts
about the kama muta construct distract them from considering the
pitfalls of the lexical fallacy. Falsifying the kama muta construct,
in whole or in part, would provide no grounds for turning a blind
eye to the lexical fallacy. Where I recount how we sought to avoid
the lexical fallacy when studying kama muta, I do so only to show
that there exists at least one promising way to avert the lexical
fallacy. In addition to the way that we followed, there are other
paths around the lexical fallacy—though perhaps the other paths
are more hazardous.
Consequences of Using Scientific Nomenclature Rather
Than Vernacular Lexemes
Coining a technical term for a construct is no panacea, and
indeed it results in not only opportunities for better communica-
tion, but also communicative challenges. If one uses a vernacular
lexeme, popular audiences and professional colleagues immedi-
ately think that they recognize (and perhaps understand) the phe-
nomenon—albeit mistakenly. In contrast, if one uses a technical
term, students, media, and the general public will not recognize the
phenomenon until it is explained to them, and they may be put off.
This is an obstacle to communication in the short run, but generally
is a good thing in the long run. It is better that people recognize
that they do not understand a concept than to have people believe
they understand it, but have it wrong. This may be especially a
problem for emotion constructs. It is likely that because people use
anger, guilt, joy, and moved to understand themselves and their
social relationships, they are prone to assume that they automati-
cally understand the technical uses of such terms. People are not so
likely to make the same assumption about less personally imme-
diate terms such as mass, current, catalyst, black hole, population,
or inflation.
To communicate theory and research on constructs denominated
by technical nomenclature, one initially has to intrigue one’s
audiences sufficiently for them to want to learn about one’s con-
struct. When the public, students, and colleagues may be alienated
by opaque technical nomenclature, starting off with examples and
vignettes often alleviates this problem. When we lecture on kama
muta, for example, we generally begin by showing a video that
reliably evokes the emotion in the audience. The experience fas-
cinates people, arousing their curiosity and motivating them to
attend to—and take seriously—what we have to say. People im-
mediately recognize the emotion in that context, whence we can
show them the other contexts in which it occurs, the many ver-
nacular lexemes they use for it, and the situations in which they
experience it without readily naming it.
In principle, a scholar could adopt a vernacular lexeme and
stipulate that when she uses the term she means precisely this and
that, bestowing on the lexeme a novel technical definition. But it
is quixotic to imagine that one can simply declare and demand that
henceforth every scientist and student shall use a vernacular lex-
eme only in the newly stipulated technical sense. The problem is
that the strict technical definition that any scholar proposes will
tend to fade from the minds of readers and listeners, who will be
prone to keep thinking of and using the term in the various and
contingent ways that their speech community has used it and
continues to use it. Worse, the thinking of the scholar herself, her
colleagues, and her students will be vulnerable to insidious, un-
recognized infection by the vernacular meanings of the lexeme. In
contrast, if one coins a technical term, one always has to acknowl-
edge that, beyond its definition, one just doesn’t know a priori
what it is, or if it really is anything—one needs to observe it in the
real world.
This brings us to the issue of how far one can go, and how far
one should go, in communicating with technical terms. To some
extent, every scientific paper is written in some version of vernac-
ular language—ideally used more consistently and with more
rigorous precision than ordinary natural language. At the other
limit, as in mathematics, it is possible to do analytic work in which
most of the entities, denoted by arbitrary signs, are carefully
defined. But at some level of regress, the definitions must have
recourse to ordinary vernacular lexemes. So, what entities should
be denoted by scientific terms, rather than ordinary language? A
useful rule of thumb may be to aim to use explicitly stipulated
scientific terms for the first two levels. So, in our work, at the top
level, kama muta denotes something that is evoked by (at the
second level) the sudden intensification of communal sharing
relationships. Communal sharing is well defined in relational mod-
els theory, has often been measured and validated, and has repeat-
edly been shown to have consistent causal relations with other
valid entities (A. P. Fiske, 1991, 1992). We have a great many
observations and some ideas inductively derived from them about
what intensification consists of, but we need to make that clearer.
We’re uncertain just what makes an intensification sudden—and
that uncertainty needs to be addressed. Kama muta is subjectively
positive, but just what sort of positivity is characteristic of it?
Again, one of the characteristic (though not invariably present)
sensations of kama muta is a sensation in the center of the chest
that people tend to describe as warm. But because there are no
known thermal receptors in the heart or anywhere else in the
thorax, we do not yet know precisely what that sensation is, what
10 My point is not to address the validity of the disorder constructs that
are distinguished in the DSM–5 or ICD-11. My point is simply that the
definitions are clear, and hence permit clear communication. Moreover,
they enable comparison of results from different studies. This clarity is
necessary to progress toward the formulation of increasingly valid con-
structs.
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15LEXICAL FALLACY
causes it, or how people sense it. Until we can specify these
aspects of the sensation, we will not have a fully explicated
construct of kama muta because kama muta is defined, in part, as
an experience that commonly (though by no means invariably)
includes a warm feeling in the center of the chest.
The category to which the construct belongs should be also
delineated as far as possible. In this essay I have treated emotion
as a scientific construct encompassing kama muta and other mo-
mentary affects. But in fact emotion is an English vernacular
lexeme whose scientific definition is problematic and contentious
(Fernández-Dols & Russell, 2003; Wierzbicka, 1999). Fridlund
(2017, p. 85) writes, “Over a century’s theory and research have
demonstrated that ‘emotion’ has proven intractable to consensual,
let along operational, definition.” In popular and scientific usage it
encompasses both momentary states like kama muta that are
evoked by specific events, along with long-enduring affective
moods or sentiments like happiness and sadness that may have no
definite elicitor (what philosophers call an intentional object).
Some theorists regard having an elicitor or object as a necessary
feature of emotions (Deonna, 2018); some do not. Some distin-
guish moods from emotions; some do not. Some distinguish atti-
tudes such as contempt from emotions (Gervais & Fessler, 2017);
some do not. In any case, researchers’ adoption of emotion as a
scientific construct is an accident of history; if academic psychol-
ogy had arisen among speakers of a language that had no such
vernacular lexeme (see Wierzbicka, 1999, 2014) they wouldn’t
take for granted that there is any such natural kind. It remains to be
determined whether emotion is a natural kind in some sense.
As a vernacular word, adopting emotion as a scientific construct
leads to all of the problems that come with adopting any other
vernacular lexeme. Hence there is little point in arguing over the
definition of emotion. So for example if scholars choose to define
emotion as the labeling of sensations, or more broadly as a set of
social/cultural/linguistic constructed entities, that’s not a problem
(for recent formulations, see, e.g., Barrett, 2014, 2017; Lindquist et
al., 2015). However, that’s not what kama muta is, and we believe
that’s not what many analogous momentary affective states are.
Ironically, the use of a scientific term to denote a construct
reminds us—or at least should remind us—that the construct is
mysterious. It reminds us that the construct is inherently provi-
sional, problematic, and perhaps mistakenly fails to correspond
with any natural kind. Use of a scientific term reminds us that the
construct requires not just empirical validation with data, but also
validation in a nomological net—it must have theoretically pred-
icated causal or functional relations with other established con-
structs (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
However, there is a converse risk that simply because a con-
struct has an impressively opaque technical name the public will
prematurely believe scientific claims about it, assuming that it
represents an authoritatively established scientific truth. There is
even a risk that scientists will make that error, believing that an
entity or process must be real and distinct simply because it has a
technical name. Even as scientists, if we do not know anything
about another field, we may tend to assume that a technical name
deployed by an expert or professor denotes valid facts. This is a
specially pernicious form of the lexical fallacy. Promulgating a
technical lexeme doesn’t make the named construct valid. So we
scientists have a delicate ethical obligation not to use technical
terms to mystify, overawe, or intimidate nonscientists or col-
leagues in other fields. A case in point is kama muta, an idea that
we’ve constructed; simply naming it doesn’t make it a fact, much
less a natural kind. We define it fairly precisely, but the precision
of the definition does not imply that there is such an emotion; its
existence, its causes and its features need to be empirically dem-
onstrated, as we are attempting to do, using an ever-expanding
variety of methods, and data from many very diverse cultures; see
www.kamamutalab.org.
So all constructs are provisional, of course. At this point in the
development of kama muta research, the construct has enabled us
to make a number of substantial inferences or predictions that
might not have been so readily derived from a concept based on a
vernacular lexeme; I’ve mentioned some of them already.
1. People experience kama muta without always being able
to recognize or label it, and
2. experience the same emotion despite giving it many
names and not recognizing that in a great may contexts
they are experiencing the same emotion, though it is not
identical in every respect.
3. Distinct emotions may occur at each kind of change in
each of the four fundamental types of relationships.
4. A great many cultural practices, institutions, roles, arti-
facts and arts exist because they evoke this emotion.
5. Kama muta is an important vehicle/process/mechanism
of devotion and commitment in politics, social move-
ments, religion, close relationships, psychotherapy, envi-
ronmentalism, support of and volunteering in charities
(all of which we’re currently investigating).
For nonscientists, mysteriously impressive scientific names tend
to connote truth and factuality. But for scholars, scientific terms
should do the opposite, making salient the need to repeatedly
reconsider and challenge the construct. Scholars know that scien-
tific terms are explicitly devised propositions proposed by re-
searchers with complex human interests and motives. So the use of
technical scientific terms should serve to remind us that the con-
structs they denote are human inventions, fabricated to explain
something, but invariably limited, intrinsically fallible, inherently
falsifiable. Constructs are imperfect tools. Yet the fabrication of
incisive technical terms is necessary for carving nature at its
immanent joints.
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